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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
CALVIN BUTTERFIELD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 930212-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for two counts of 
assault by prisoner, 3rd degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1990), and one count of escape from official 
custody, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-8-309 (1990), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, 
Judge, presiding. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
CALVIN BUTTERFIELD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 930212-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following rules are set forth in full in Addendum A: 
Rule 4 01, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 404, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in denying Mr. 
Butterfield's motion in limine concerning references at trial to 
his status as a parolee? 
Standard of review. 
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on the 
admissibility of evidence under rule 403, we will not 
overturn the court's determination unless it was an 
"abuse of discretion." To state the matter more 
precisely, we review the trial court's 403 ruling 
admitting or denying admission to evidence by deciding 
whether, as a matter of law, the trial court's decision 
that "the unfairly prejudicial potential of the evidence 
outweighs [or does not outweigh] its probativeness" was 
beyond the limits of reasonability. Of course, like any 
other evidentiary ruling, an erroneous decision to admit 
or exclude evidence based on rule 4 03 cannot result in 
reversible error unless the error is harmful.25 
25Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 239 (brackets in original) 
(citations omitted); accord Verde, 770 P.2d at 120. 
State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1241 and n.25 (Utah 1993) . 
Admission of evidence of prior crimes "is presumed prejudicial and, 
absent a reason for the admission of the evidence other than to 
show criminal disposition, the evidence is excluded." State v. 
Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Mr. Butterfield, a parolee, was charged with escape and 
assault by a prisoner for an alleged assault on Adult Probation & 
Parole agents Brad Bassi and Swen Heinberg on September 4, 1992. 
See R. 16-18 (amended information), R. 26 (State's witness list, 
indicating Mr. Bassi and Heinberg are AP&P agents), R. 161 
(stipulation to these facts for purposes of pretrial motions). 
Mr. Butterfield filed a motion in limine, R. 28-9, 
seeking inter alia suppression of all evidence concerning his 
status as a parolee. This aspect of the motion in limine was 
denied. R. 2 04-5. 
At trial, evidence concerning Mr. Butterfield's status as 
a parolee was elicited. Mr. Butterfield was convicted on all 
counts. R. 104-6 (jury verdicts), R. 142-4 (judgement, sentence 
and commitments). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 31, 1992, Mr. Butterfield filed a motion in 
limine. R. 28-9. A motion to quash bindover was filed on February 
10, 1993, R. 54-5, together with a motion to dismiss, R. 56-7. 
These three motions were argued to the court on February 10, 1993. 
See transcript, R. 158-207. Judge Lewis denied the motions to 
dismiss or quash bindover. The motion in limine was granted in 
part and denied in part. See R. 88 (minute entry) . The aspect of 
the motion in limine at issue here, concerning Mr. Butterfield's 
status as a parolee, was denied. R. 204-5 (parolee status would 
not be suppressed) -1 Jury trial was held on February 16-17, 1993. 
See transcripts, R. 208 (February 16; not separately paginated), R. 
209 (February 17; not separately paginated). 
Mr. Butterfield's status as a parolee was mentioned at 
trial. See R. 208:103, 135-6, 141; Exhibit 2. At the start of 
his testimony, Officer Bassi indicated that he is employed by the 
Department of Corrections. R. 208:106. He later testified 
concerning certain policy matters within the Utah Department of 
Corrections. R. 208:115. On cross-examination, defense counsel 
fully explored Officer Bassi's position as a parole agent 
xOther aspects of the court's rulings include: R. 188-9 (video 
tape ruled relevant; court reserves judgment on probativeness 
versus prejudicial effect), R. 191 (statement "I've done a lot of 
time" will be excluded"), R. 193-4 (by stipulation, there would be 
no reference to alcohol use as a parole violation, or other parole 
conditions) , and R. 198 (all officers are to be referred to as 
"peace officers" rather than correctional officers, parole 
officers, or the like; Orange Street Community Correctional 
Facility will be referred to as a custodial facility). 
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supervisor. R. 208:135-6. Exhibit 2, a No Warrant Arrest Fact 
Sheet, indicates that "subject [Mr. Butterfield] was placed under 
arrest for Parole Violation / Public Intox. At trial, Officer 
Bassi and his partner (Officer Heinberg) were referred to as 
"agents" on numerous occasions. E.g., R. 208:107, 111, 113, 118-
21, 123, 124, 131, 148, 189, and 222. See also Exhibit 2. After 
Officer Bassi was reluctant to reveal the name of the doctor he 
visited, the prosecutor inquired as to why and Officer Bassi 
stated, "Yes, our policy is that we don't normally give out 
personal informat ion to parolees." R. 208:171. Officer Allred 
testified that she was called to the alleged crime scene "[t]o 
transport a prisoner for AP&P." R. 208:244. She also refers to 
Officers Bassi and Heinberg as "AP&P officers." R. 208:246. 
Potential juror Riley (later dismissed for cause, R. 
208:74) indicated that he might be acquainted with Mr. Butterfield, 
and stated "I have worked a lot with the alcoholics and the people 
coming out of jail." R. 208:54. Defense counsel moved for a 
mistrial, R. 208:78, which was denied, R. 208:80-82. 
The jury convicted Mr. Butterfield on all counts. R. 
209:328-9 (verdicts read in court); 104-6 (signed verdicts). Mr. 
Butterfield was sentenced to concurrent terms of six months, 0 to 
5 years, and 0 to 5 years, and ordered to pay fines totaling 
$11,000, together with 85% surcharges. R. 142-4. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court denied Mr. Butterfield's motion in limine 
to suppress at trial all evidence of his status as a parolee. At 
trial, such evidence was introduced. Mr. Butterfield's parolee 
status had no relevance to any fact issues related to the charges 
against Mr. Butterfield. Even if probative on some issue, its 
probative value would be outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 
Evidence of prior crimes is presumed prejudicial, and the jury was 
probably influenced by the evidence. Mr. Butterfield should be 
granted a new trial at which his parolee status is suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING 
EVIDENCE OF MR. BUTTERFIELD'S STATUS AS A 
PAROLEE TO BE INTRODUCED. 
"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in conformity 
therewith." Rule 404(b). 
Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible at 
trial provided it has "a special relevance to a 
controverted issue and is introduced for a purpose other 
than to show the defendant's predisposition to 
criminality." State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 426 
(Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295 
(Utah 1988)) . 
State v. Cox, 787 P. 2d 4, 5 (Utah App. 1990) . " [E] vidence of other 
crimes is generally inadmissible unless it tends to have a special 
relevance to a controverted issue and is introduced for a purposed 
other than to show the defendant's predisposition to criminality." 
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Shickles, 760 P.2d at 295 (citing State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 
741 (Utah 1985). 
In this case, Mr. Butterfield7s parolee status had no 
"special relevance" to any of the charges against him. This is not 
a case similar to State v. Nelson, 777 P.2d 479, 481 (Utah 1989) 
where "other crimes are so linked with the crime charged in point 
of time and circumstance that one cannot be shown without proving 
the other." Mr. Butterfield's prisoner status could be proven by 
evidence of his arrest for public intoxication. Cf. State v. 
Lancaster, 765 P. 2d 872 (Utah 1988) (in assault by prisoner, prior 
conviction was admissible to show that defendant was in fact a 
prisoner at time offense was committed). 
Mr. Butterfield's parolee status was unnecessary and not 
probative of any element of the crimes with which he was charged. 
"The only possible effect of such testimony could have would be to 
leave an impression with the jury of defendant's bad character. 
The admission of the testimony was therefore prejudicial." State 
v. Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192, 195 (Utah 1985), cert denied, 479 U.S. 
813, 107 S.Ct. 64, 93 L.Ed.2d 22 (1986) . Pacheco concerned 
defendant's statement that a ring found in his car was the result 
of a prior burglary, and did not relate in any way to the charges 
then pending. 
Even if the evidence has probative value, it is still 
subject to the balancing test of Rule 403. Id. If Mr. 
Butterfield's status as a parolee was conceivably probative on any 
issue, its probative value was clearly outweighed by its 
6 
prejudicial effect. Admission of evidence of prior crimes "is 
presumed prejudicial and, absent a reason for the admission of the 
evidence other than to show criminal disposition, the evidence is 
excluded." Saunders, 699 P.2d at 741. The jury in this case was 
probably influenced by the evidence concerning Mr. Butterfield's 
parolee status, and absent such evidence might have rendered a more 
favorable verdict. 
Mr. Butterfield's status as a parolee should have been 
suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Butterfield7s parolee status should have been 
suppressed. This case should be remanded for a new trial at which 
his parolee status is suppressed. ^) 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _[ day of September, 1993. 
{licidj.— 
ROBERT K. HfEINEMAN 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t / A p p e l l a n t 
DAVID P. S. MACK 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused 
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this / day of 
September, 1993. 
/ / / — 
Robert K. Heineman 
DELIVERED/MAILED this day of September, 1993. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence. 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
Rule 404, Utah Rules of Evidence (as amended effective 
October 1, 1992) provides in pertinent part: 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove 
conduct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs# or acts. Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in conformity therewith. It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
Rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence (as amended effective 
October 1, 1992) provides in pertinent part: 
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of 
crime. 
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the 
credibility of a witness, 
(1) evidence that a witness other than the 
accused has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 
one year under the law under which the witness was 
convicted, and evidence that an accused has been 
convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the 
court determines that the probative value of 
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial 
effect to the accused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted 
of a crime shall be admitted if it involved 
dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
